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Abstract
This paper experimentally examines a new auditing rule termed the bounded rule,
which takes into account the budget constraint of the auditor (e.g., a tax authority).
Compared to a traditional rule that audits income reports with a constant probability,
the bounded rule can induce the same deterrence e¤ect with a smaller budget. The
basic setting follows a classic tax-compliance game in which each taxpayer receives
either high or low income with certain probability. On knowing an auditing rule, the
taxpayers have to decide simultaneously and independently whether to report their
income truthfully to the auditor. The traditional rule audits every low-income report
with a constant probability. The bounded rule audits a randomly selected sample
of low-income reports whenever the number of these reports exceeds the maximum
number of audits allowed by the budget, or otherwise all of the low-income reports.
The experimental evidence suggests that, as predicted, the two auditing rules have
the same deterrence e¤ect. The bounded rule needs a smaller budget ex-ante, and
conducts fewer audits ex-post. The results provide support for the bounded rule as a
more cost-e¤ective alternative to the traditional rule.
JEL Classication numbers: H26, M42, C9, C72
Keywords: Audit sampling plan, tax audit, tax compliance, tax evasion, experi-
mental economics.
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1 Introduction
Tax compliance has been a central topic for government tax agencies. According to the
US Internal Revenue Service (IRS), the most recent estimated tax gap (i.e. the di¤erence
between what taxpayers should pay and what they actually pay) ranges from $312 billion
to $353 billion. About 50 percent of the gap can be attributed to individual income under-
reporting. Due to the enormous size of the gap, each 1 percent reduction of the gap would
likely yield more than $2.5 billion annually (US Department of the Treasury (2005)). Hence,
in the last ve years, roughly half of the IRSs annual budget ($4.7 to $5.5 billion) was
allocated for enforcement purposes, including increasing tax compliance, improving data-
matching technology and promoting the e¤ectiveness of evasion detection (US Government
Accountability O¢ ce (2009)). In light of the huge budgets devoted to reduce the tax gap,
this paper explores the possibility of conducting tax audits more e¢ ciently. In particular, it
examines an auditing rule that induces the target deterrence level with a lower budget.
The existing tax-compliance literature widely analyzes a simple random auditing rule.
That is, each taxpayer is independently selected for audit with a constant probability (see,
for example, Moser et al. (1995), Zimbelman and Waller (1999), Boylan and Sprinkle (2001),
Kim et al. (2005), Kim and Waller (2005), Alm et al. (2009) and Kleven et al. (2010)). For
simplicity, we term this the traditional rule.
One undesirable feature of the traditional rule is that the auditing budget can be used in-
e¢ ciently. Due to uncertainty arising from the random auditing decisions or other sources1,
the actual auditing expenditure could vary substantially across years. This leads to di¢ cul-
ties in planning resources ex-ante. Consequently, the IRS needs a large budget to support the
traditional rule. In reality, however, budgets set aside for organizational activities including
auditing have limited exibility for other purposes unless under extraordinary circumstances
(see, e.g. US Department of the Treasury (2006)). If the IRS sets aside a large budget
for auditing purposes but only uses a fraction of the budget, then it ine¢ ciently ties up
resources that could have been better used elsewhere for an entire scal year. In sum, the
1For instance, the proportion of the red-agged(suspicious) reports led could vary signicantly across
years. If the tax-evasion rate uctuates along with the condition of the general economy, the IRS cannot
distinguish whether the cause is tax evasion or other reasons, upon observing many red-agged reports.
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IRS might have a greater incentive to formulate auditing rules that plan and use budgets
more e¢ ciently.
This paper analyzes an auditing rule named the bounded rule. When applying the bounded
rule, the auditor needs to set up an audit capacity (i.e., a maximum number of audits allowed
by the budget). The bounded rule chooses an audit sample from the population of red-
agged (suspicious) tax reports, given the audit capacity. It audits a randomly selected
sample of these suspicious reports whenever its total number exceeds the audit capacity, or
otherwise all of these reports. Unlike the traditional rule, the audit probability of a taxpayer
under the bounded rule is no longer exogenously given. Instead, it hinges on the proportion
of red-agged reports submitted. The feature of endogenous audit probability induces
strategic interactions among taxpayers. Nevertheless, for any given number of players and
income distribution, the bounded rule can induce the same deterrence e¤ect as the traditional
rule with a targeted level of audit probability. Put di¤erently, the induced tax-compliance
level is the same under both rules. However, the bounded rule requires a lower budget and
uses the budget more e¢ ciently.2
Our laboratory experiment supports the bounded rule as a more cost-e¤ective alternative
to the traditional rule. The laboratory o¤ers a controlled environment to test the deterrence
e¤ect of auditing rules directly. Such control can isolate many factors that confound behavior.
It is also helpful in examining factors that have been omitted in the theory, such as bounded
rationality and risk attitudes.
The laboratory setting in this paper is as follows. Every taxpayer has a certain probability
of receiving high or low income. Knowing a certain auditing rule, they have to decide simul-
taneously and independently whether to report their income truthfully to the tax authority.
The tax authority implements either the traditional or the bounded rule after deducting
taxes according to players reported income. Parameters are selected such that the two
auditing rules induce the same level of compliance.
2The idea of the bounded rule is inspired by Yim (2009). A key assumption distinguishing this paper
from Yim (2009) is the ability of the auditor to commit to an auditing strategy. In Yim (2009), the
auditor interacts strategically with taxpayers, and chooses the audit probability on observing the behavior
of taxpayers. In this study, the auditor commits to an auditing strategy so that the focus is on the reactions
of the taxpayers. Consequently, the properties of the bounded rule explored in this study are fundamentally
di¤erent from Yim (2009).
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The main experimental results are the following. The deterrence e¤ect of the bounded rule
is as strong as that of a traditional rule. However, the bounded rule is more cost-e¤ective for
two reasons. First, it conducts fewer audits to attain the same level of deterrence. Second, it
uses the budget more e¢ ciently. The budget-usage ratio, which is dened as the percentage
of resources actually used in auditing for a given budget, is higher for the bounded rule.
The data also show that theory underpredicts the level of deterrence. In other words,
the compliance level for both rules is higher than theoretical predictions. The reason is
that subjects decisions are highly stochastic, as a large proportion of them switch their
decisions across periods. In order to account for behavioral anomalies, this paper develops
and compares several structural models on choices under risk and uncertainty. The behavior
in our data is consistent with a model of loss aversion with stochastic decision errors.
So far, the bounded rule has generated deterrence solely based on behavioral instead of
theoretical reasons. This paper also examines the bounded rule in another parameter do-
main where theory could predict full compliance. In this new treatment, all parameters
remain the same except that the ex-ante probability of receiving high income increases. The
game induced by the bounded rule has both a payo¤-dominant equilibrium in which all
strategic taxpayers underreport, and a risk-dominant equilibrium in which all strategic tax-
payers report truthfully. The experimental evidence suggests that in the presence of multiple
equilibria, the bounded rule generates even higher deterrence, as playersbehavior tends to
converge to the full-compliance equilibrium. The parameters chosen in this treatment re-
semble a rich neighborhood where every taxpayer is likely to earn high income. The results
provide further support for the bounded rule as a more cost-e¤ective auditing rule when the
income distribution is left-skewed.
This study makes three contributions. First, it o¤ers experimental evidence on a new
cost-e¤ective auditing rule. Several studies discuss alternative auditing rules opposed to
the simple random audit.3 Although these papers suggest that rules contingent on strategic
interactions among players might prove to be more deterrent, little is known about the actual
responses of taxpayers to these rules. This study empirically shows that the bounded rule is
3See, for instance, Reinganum and Wilde (1985), Harrington (1988) and Bayer and Cowell (2009). Slem-
rod and Yitzhaki (2002) provide a detailed discussion of these alternative auditing rules.
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more cost-e¤ective than the traditional rule.
Second, the paper presents an example of using more realistic assumptions in the ex-
perimental tax-compliance literature. The traditional rule and its variants have been widely
studied in this literature (see the literature review by Alm andMcKee (1998), Torgler (2002)).
A meta study by Blackwell (2007) based on twenty laboratory experimental studies nds that
an increase in audit probability or ne rate leads to higher compliance, but an increase in
the tax rate has no signicant e¤ect. The previous studies, by assuming a simple random
audit, neglect the resource constraint in reality.4 This paper proposes a relatively easy way
of modeling budget constraints in constructing auditing rules, and shows a rst piece of
evidence that the deterrence e¤ect induced is indeed the same.
Third, this paper is the rst to estimate structural models of utility using data from a
tax-compliance experiment. These models require less strict assumptions regarding cognitive
reasoning or the ability to form correct beliefs, and hence o¤er a much more satisfactory
account of behavior in our data. Moreover, the exercise of structural estimation allows the
comparison of alternative behavioral models.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the tax-compliance model and
auditing rules that are examined in the experiment. Section 3 constructs an experimental
design in which the two auditing rules induce the same level of compliance, and then analyses
the experimental data with both nonparametric and parametric methods. Section 4 examines
the bounded rule in another parameter domain where the interactions among players have
multiple equilibria. Section 5 displays the e¤ect of learning and social demographics on
compliance behavior. Section 6 concludes and discusses directions for future research.
4Cason and Gangadharan (2006) test the Harrington (1988) model in which the audit probability neg-
atively correlate with the agentsprevious compliance performance. Alm et al. (1993) examine a cut-o¤
rule by combining a sure audit below a threshold on reported income and a small, random audit above the
threshold. Alm and McKee (2004) consider another cut-o¤ rule with audit probability depending on the
deviation of an individuals reported income from the average of the incomes reported by all other players.
This paper di¤ers from theirs in that the bounded rule induces interactions among taxpayers, but such
interaction does not always need to be a coordination game.
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2 Model Description
The model of this paper builds upon some basic features of a classic tax-compliance game
developed by Graetz et al. (1986). Consider a player population of size N . For simplicity,
the model assumes two income classes: high and low, denoted IH and IL, respectively, where
IL < IH . Each player has a probability q of being a high-income taxpayer (H-type) and
1   q of being a low-income taxpayer (L-type), where 0 < q < 1. Players know the type
distribution as well as their own types, but they do not know the exact types of the other
players. Each player has to decide simultaneously and privately whether to report high
income (IH) or low income (IL) to the tax authority. Let TH and TL for the tax payment
by high- and low-income taxpayers, respectively, where TH < IH , TL < IL, and TL < TH .
If cheaters are audited, then a ne F is imposed on top of the tax they should have paid
(F > 0). However, taxpayers who report truthfully are never ned and incur no cost if
they are audited. The following analysis assumes that players are homogeneous, rational,
risk-neutral prot maximizers.
The traditional rule can be presented easily. Any taxpayer who has led a low-income
report will face a at probability aTR of being audited independently. Since reporting truth-
fully does not incur any cost when being audited, L-type players always report their income
truthfully. If they report high income, they will be taxed TH , which is strictly larger than
the tax TL they need to pay if they honestly state income. For H-type players, the honest-
reporting payo¤ is IH TH . If they underreport, the payo¤ is IH TL if they are not audited,
and IH   TH   F if they are audited. Therefore, they choose to underreport if and only if
the expected prot is strictly larger:
(1  aTR)(IH   TL) + aTR(IH   TH   F ) > (IH   TH):
If the audit probability is less than the threshold a dened by
a =
TH   TL
F + TH   TL ,
the H-type players will underreport. Otherwise, if the audit probability is larger than a,
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they choose to report truthfully.
Note, however, that the traditional rule does not model the budget constraint explicitly.
In fact, due to its coin-ippingnature, the application of the traditional rule implicitly
assumes that the tax agency has the budget to carry out a full audit of N les. Even in
terms of expected number of audits, the larger the number of low-incomereports L turned
in, the larger is the expected number of audits needed. The following paragraph presents an
alternative auditing rule taking into account the resources of the tax agency. It allows the
tax agency to induce the same level of compliance with a lower budget.
The bounded rule requires the auditor to set up a maximum number of K audits allowed,
given the budget. It then constructs an audit sample size contingent on the number of low-
incomereports L. If L is smaller than or equal to the audit capacity K, the auditor will
audit all L reports. However, if L is strictly larger than K, then the auditor will randomly
audit K reports. Expressed more formally, every low-incometaxpayer under the bounded
rule faces the following audit probability:
aBD =
8<: 1 if L  KK=L if L > K
for L = 0; 1; :::N .
The key feature of the bounded rule is that the audit probability aBD is no longer ex-
ogenously given. Instead, it depends on the audit capacity K and the number of reported
low-incomeles L. The latter is a function of population size N and the ex-ante probabil-
ity q of being an H-type. The following proposition characterizes a property of the bounded
rule.
Proposition 1 For any given N and q, the auditor can always choose an audit capacity
K for the bounded rule such that it induces the same compliance level as the traditional rule.
Proof: See appendix A.
The intuition of Proposition 1 is as follows. Any audit probability aTR under the tradi-
tional rule induces all-or-none compliance behavior. If the maximum number of K is so high
that all low-incomereports will always be audited for sure, H-type players will have no in-
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centive to underreport. On the other hand, if K is zero (meaning that no audit is conducted
regardless of the number of low-incomereports submitted), then H-type players will un-
derreport with certainty. Between these two extreme cases there exists a threshold K such
that any K > K sustains compliance behavior regardless of the actual income-realization
parameter q. That is, even in the scenario which all taxpayers claim low income, the audit
probability is still high enough to deter tax evasion.
To induce full compliance, however, the committed budget K does not always need to be
larger than K. Put it di¤erently, even when K < K, the bounded rule is still able to induce
full compliance. Depending on the parameters, the interactions among taxpayers induced by
the bounded rule could either be a dominance-solvable game with one unique equilibrium, or
a coordination game with multiple equilibria. Section 3 examines the former case focusing
on comparing its deterrence e¤ect to that of the traditional rule. Then it examines the latter
case in Section 4.
The above analysis shows a desirable feature of the bounded rule. That is, the maximum
audit number needed to sustain the full compliance equilibrium, K, is always less than
N , which is the maximum number of audits needed for a traditional rule. Consequently,
without sacricing the induced-compliance e¤ect, the tax agency can always commit to a
lower budget to support the implementation of the bounded rule.
3 Dominance
3.1 Experimental Design and Procedure
This section presents the experimental procedures and parameters that induce the same
deterrence e¤ect for both auditing rules. Based on the capacity constraint in the lab, the
size of the taxpayer population is xed to be N = 8.
The tax-compliance game in both treatments has three stages: (i) income reporting and
tax deduction, (ii) audit and ne deduction, and (iii) feedback. Subjects receive either high
income (IH) e25 or low income (IL) e10 with probability (q) 0.5. Subjects are informed
about the group size N and the probability q. During the income-reporting stage, they
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have to decide simultaneously and independently the type of income to report to an auditor,
which is simulated by a computer. The computer automatically deducts taxes according to
the reported income. The tax for subjects reporting high income(TH) is e12.5, whereas
the tax for subjects reporting low income (TL) is e2.5.5 Subjects are told that taxes
are deducted based on their reported income instead of true income. For instance, H-type
players receive e22.5, instead of e12.5, if they submit low-incomereports. Similarly, L-
type players receive -e2.5, instead of e7.5, if they submit high-incomereports.6 In the
audit stage, the computer implements either a traditional rule or a bounded rule to audit
low-incometaxpayers.
Traditional: In the traditional rule sessions, subjects ling low-incomereports face an
independent audit probability of 0.4. This audit probability induces the same compliance
rate to the bounded rule.7 If they indeed report honestly, nothing will happen to their nal
payo¤s. However, if cheaters are caught by the auditor, then they need to pay back the e10
of taxes evaded plus a ne (F ) of e10.
Bounded: In the bounded rule sessions, the audit probability depends on the total number
of low-incomereports received. The maximum number of audits to be conducted isK = 2.
This means that if the number of low-income reports does not exceed two, then all of them
will be audited with probability 1. Otherwise, the audit probability decreases monotonically
with the number of low-incomereports L. In particular, the probability is 0.67 for L = 3;
0.5 for L = 4; 0.4 for L = 5; 0.33 for L = 6; 0.29 for L = 7; and 0.25 for L = 8. This
parameter K guarantees a unique Nash equilibrium based on non-cooperative game theory
(see analysis below). The ne for cheaters is exactly the same as in the Traditional treatment.
The experiments are conducted at the CentER Lab in Tilburg University from October
5Experimental parameters concerning taxation are chosen to be in line with reality. For instance, the
real-world tax rates for high-income and low-income taxpayers are usually dependent on the levels of their
incomes. In particular, many countries such as Britain, the Netherlands, Germany, Italy and the USA use
a progressive tax system instead of a proportional one. Hence, this experiment adopts a progressive tax
system for the sake of facilitating subjectsunderstanding.
6Even when a subject with low income makes a loss by submitting high income reports and that
decision is selected for payment, the potential loss is covered by a show-up fee of e3. During the experiment
sessions, this situation never actually happens.
7Due to the fact that the traditional rule induces all-or-none behavior in compliance, any audit probability
a < 0:5 is theoretically equivalent to the bounded rule. Nevertheless, this statement only holds for perfectly
rational, risk- neutral players. To what extent this holds is an empirical question to be tested.
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to December 2009. Tilburg University students, mostly major in economics or business,
participate as subjects in the experiment. Each treatment consists of four sessions of 16
subjects each. The duration of a session is about 1 hour (including the initial instruction
and nal payment to subjects). The average earnings are e16.23 (including the e3 show-
up fee). The experiments are programmed and conducted in Z-Tree software ( Fischbacher
(2007)).
The instructions of the tax-compliance game are modied from instructions in prior studies
of the literature, namely Alm et al. (2009), Kim et al. (2005), and Kim and Waller (2005)
(see Appendix B.2). At the beginning of each session, subjects are randomly assigned to the
computer terminals. Before the experiment starts, subjects have to complete an exercise to
make sure they understand the rules of the game.
The game consists of 30 periods. At the beginning of each period, 16 subjects are randomly
allocated into two groups of eight. The random rematching protocol minimizes the chances
that subjects encounter the same group of participants again. It simulates a one-shot scenario
but allows the subjects to be familiar with the game environment. At the end of each period,
a summary screen is presented to subjects with feedback information including the subjects
true and reported income, and the nal payo¤ for the period. Subjects are not informed of
otherspayo¤s.
Upon completing the tax-compliance experiment, subjects are asked to complete a risk
elicitation task similar to the one used by Holt and Laury (2002).The instructions for the
risk elicitation task are handed out only after the tax-compliance game. Hence, the subjects
are not aware of its existence beforehand. In this task, subjects have to make selections
of a set of 21 lottery pairs. Each lottery pair consists of a safe and a risky lottery. The
expected payo¤ of the risky lottery compared to the safe one is the lowest in the rst pair,
and the highest in the last pair. The switching point from the safe to the risky lottery reects
subjectsrisk tolerance level. These data is used to explain behavior in the tax-compliance
game.
At the end of the experiment, subjects are asked to complete two questionnaires. The
rst one concerns social background information such as gender, nationality, and years of
studying economics. The second one elicits subjectsMachiavelli scores by means of the
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Machiavellian scale personality test (see Christie and Geis (1970)).8
During the payment stage, one period of the tax game and the realization of one lottery
are randomly selected to determine the nal payment of a subject. This random payment
scheme mitigates the potential income e¤ect that subjects carry across games and over
di¤erent periods within a game.
3.2 Hypotheses
This section presents hypotheses regarding the deterrence e¤ect of both rules. The deterrence
e¤ect is indicated by the underreporting rate in the population: namely, the proportion of
high-income taxpayers ling low-incomereports in a certain period. As discussed in Section
2, the analysis focuses on the H-type players, as the L-type players have a dominant strategy
of reporting honestly, regardless of the auditing rules.9
In the following, let h be the honestly reporting strategy for H-type players, and u be
the underreporting strategy. As the audit probability aTR is set to be 0.4 for the traditional
rule, an underreporting decision is equivalent to selecting a lottery of e22.5 with probability
0.6 and e2.5 with probability 0.4. The expected payo¤ is therefore: E(u) = e22:5 0:6 +
e2:50:4 = e14:5. As it is strictly larger than the sure payo¤e12.5 from an honest report,
H-type players are expected to underreport.
Under the bounded rule, the H-type players again face the tax-evasion gamble of choosing
a sure payo¤ of e12.5, or a high payo¤ of e22.5 if they are not audited but a low payo¤e2.5
otherwise. Unlike the traditional rule, however, the audit probability aBD is not exogenously
given. Instead, it depends on the playersperception of the actions of others. In particular,
it depends on player is subjective belief on the likelihood of the proportion of low-income
reports turned in by another player, denoted by Bi.
A low-income report could come from two sources. The rst source is from a truth-
telling L-type player with probability 1 q. Alternatively, it could come from H-type players
who dishonestly report that they have received low income. If a player thinks that the
8This test measures a persons predisposition to be opportunistic and manipulative; with higher scores
indicating that these properties are more pronounced.
9The actual percentage of honest reports among L-type taxpayers are 99.68% and 99.28% across treat-
ments, suggesting that they do play the dominant strategy.
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underreporting probability of H-type players i is bi, this scenario will occur with probability
qbi. Hence, the overall probability of observing a low-incomereport Bi for player i is the
sum of the probabilities in these two situations: Bi = 1  q + qbi.
The Nash equilibrium of this game can be reached by iterated elimination of dominated
strategies. The intuition proceeds as follows. Reporting high income is a dominated strategy
for L-type players, since they have to pay a high tax and incur a lower payo¤than they would
otherwise. If the H-type players believe that the L-type obey dominance, then the strategy
of reporting truthfully (h) is dominated. That is, even when a H-type player believes that
no other players evade taxes, the expected payo¤ of underreporting is still higher than that
of honest reporting. Such a high expected payo¤ is caused by a low audit probability strictly
less than 0.5, which stems from the fact that all of the L-type players (about half of the
population) state low income truthfully. The calculation also gurantees that evading taxes is
always a best response for a H-type player when L-type players obey dominance. Proposition
2 derives the equilibrium underreporting decisions.
Proposition 2 The game introduced by the bounded rule is dominance solvable. In the
equilibrium, both the L-type and H-type players report low income.
Proof: See appendix A.
Note that the above hypothesis holds for strategic, self-regarding prot maximizers. Now
suppose that some players are intrinsically honest: they report their income truthfully, re-
gardless of their type. This assumption does not change the direction in terms of treatment
di¤erences. Recall that in the Bounded treatment, the optimal strategy of the H-type players
does not depend on their beliefs towards other H-type players. As long as they believe that
L-types will not play dominated strategy (i.e. reporting high income), they can form expec-
tations on the proportion of low-incomereports led in each realized income distribution.
Given that the ex-ante probability of being a L-type player is su¢ ciently high (q = 0:5),
the sure payo¤ for a H-type player to report honestly is lower than the expected payo¤ from
underreporting, even when s/he does not expect any other H-types to underreport. This
ensures that all H-type players will continue to underreport with or without honest players.
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The analysis in the Traditional treatment is simpler. As player decisions are independent,
the audit probability facing self-regarding prot maximizers is una¤ected by honest play-
ers. In sum, if the percentage of intrinsically honest players is assumed to be the same in
both treatments, the compliance rate is the same. For the mathematical formulation, see
Appendix A.
Let bTR be the underreporting rate in the Traditional treatment, and bBD be the under-
reporting rate in the Bounded treatment. The rst hypothesis is built upon Proposition
2:
Hypothesis 1 The underreporting rate is the same under both rules: bTR = bBD:
The expected number of audits under the Traditional treatment, LTR, depends on the
number of low-incomereports. Let pTR denote the percentage of players that submitted
low-incomeamong N players. In our setting, if pTR > 5
8
, then LTR will be larger than
the two audits committed in the Bounded treatment. Assume the cost of an audit to be the
same in both treatments. Since the Bounded treatment needs fewer audits, it has a lower
implementation cost.
Hypothesis 2 If the percentage of low-income reports submitted is larger than 62.5% ,
the number of audits is smaller in the Bounded treatment than in the Traditional treatment.
3.3 Average Treatment E¤ect
Table 1 summarizes the descriptive results of non-compliance behavior and prots across ex-
perimental treatments. All statistics reported in this table are on the session level. Columns
2 and 3 contain averages over all 30 periods of play, and columns 4 and 5 contain the results
for the last 10 periods, where the behavioral pattern is more stable.
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Table 1: Summary statistics across treatments (standard errors in parentheses)
All 30 Periods Last 10 Periods
Traditional Bounded Traditional Bounded
All subjects
High-income probability 0.514
(0.007)
0.491
(0.039)
0.527
(0.042)
0.519
(0.038)
Percentage of low-incomereports 79.741%
(0.074)
78.853%
(0.015)
77.969%
(0.066)
75.935%
(0.018)
H-type subjects
Underreport frequency 60.829%
(0.144)
57.114%
(0.049)
58.163%
(0.143)
53.321%
(0.052)
Average underreport prot 14.513
(0.650)
16.446
(0.285)
13.272
(0.967)
15.781
(1.979)
Auditing statistics
Total audit number 153.751
(18.140)
120
(0.000)
53.75
(8.098)
40
(0.000)
Average audit number
(per group per period)
2.563
(0.300)
2
(0.000)
2.692
(0.414)
2
(0.000)
Audit frequency 40.161%
(0.030)
31.712%
(0.006)
42.958%
(0.038)
32.943%
(0.007)
Budget usage ratio 32.033%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
32.091%
(0.181)
100%
(0.000)
Cheater detection rate 38.762%
(0.065)
33.134%
(0.043)
42.082%
(0.107)
31.876%
(0.125)
The two rows on top of the table report statistics concerning all subjects. The rst row
indicates that the actual probability of being an H-type in both treatments is very close to
their pre-specied levels with repeated drawing. The second row displays the percentage of
low-income reports among all reports (i.e. reports from L-type players and the untruthful
ones by H-type players). This number is around 80% in both treatments, which satises the
condition in Hypothesis 2 allowing the comparison of the implementation costs of the two
rules.
The next two rows focus on H-type players. The third row reports the overall underre-
port frequency, which is 60.83% in the Traditional treatment and 57.11% in the Bounded
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treatment. A two-sided Wilcoxon rank-sum test cannot reject the null hypothesis that the
underreport frequencies of the two treatments are the same (p = 0:386). The prot for the
cheaters in the Bounded treatment is e2 higher (p < 0:05), which may be due to the fact
that the detection rate in this treatment is lower than that in the traditional rule (see the
last row).
The nal four rows concern audit statistics. Two pieces of evidence support the bounded
rule to be more cost-e¤ective. To begin with, it can sustain the same level of compliance with
a lower cost. Due to the fact that the auditor e¤ectively commits to fewer audit resources
under the bounded rule, both the total audit number and the audit frequency are signicantly
lower (p < 0:05). This result is robust even when comparing the average number of audits
per group per period (p < 0:05).
Apart from a lower implementation cost, the bounded rule has a higher budget-usage
ratio. The budget usage ratio is dened as the percentage of resources actually used for a
given budget. This gure is 100% in the Bounded treatment, which means that all resources
committed are used at their full capacity in each period (i.e. two audits). Under the
traditional rule, the budget-usage ratio is only 32.03%. The ine¢ ciency comes from the
fact that while the auditor has to prepare resources to do all eight audits in each period,
only a small fraction of audits are actually carried out.
The last column shows the e¤ectiveness of cheater detection. The success rate is higher
in the Traditional than in the Bounded treatment, though not statistically signicant (p =
0:113).
In both treatments, the underreporting rates decrease over time. Due to fewer low-
incomereports, the relative audit frequencies increase, and cheaters earn less. Nevertheless,
the results of cross-treatment comparisons remain the same. Results 1 and 2 summarize the
main ndings in this section.
Result 1 Hypothesis 1 is supported. The observed underreporting rates are not statistically
di¤erent between the two treatments, although the absolute levels are signicantly lower.
Result 2 Hypothesis 2 is supported. The bounded rule uses resources more e¢ ciently in
that 1) The average number of audits in the Bounded treatment is signicantly smaller than
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that in the Traditional treatment, and 2) The budget-usage ratio is higher.
3.4 Individual Behavior in the Game
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the underreporting rate for H-type players across treat-
ments. The horizontal axis represents subjectsunderreporting frequency throughout the
game (i.e. the percentage of times when they receive high income and decide to underre-
port). The vertical axis represents the proportion of players having similar underreporting
frequency in each treatment.
Figure 1: Individual underreporting frequency distribution
The main message conveyed by Figure 1 is that theory has limited explanatory power
over the individual-level data: Only 29.13% of the subjects in the Traditional treatment
and 23.43% of subjects in the Bounded treatment behave exactly in accordance with theory.
That is, they underreport whenever they receive high income throughout the experiment.
The percentage of intrinsically honest subjects who always report their income truthfully is
12.5% and 15.63%, respectively. Even corrected for the presence of honest players, theory
underpredicts the deterrence e¤ect of both auditing rules. According to Figure 1, around
60 percent of the subjects switch between the two options with various levels of frequency.
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This pattern is the same in both treatments (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0:322).
3.4.1 Choice models under uncertainty
This section attempts to develop alternative models that explain the stochastic component of
behavior. Theory based on individual prot maximization makes two unrealistic assumptions
regarding behavior. The rst is the assumption of perfect rationality. In reality, people
are usually bounded by the cognitive limitation of their minds, given the amount of time
they have to make decisions. The second assumption is of risk neutrality. The experimental
literature documents mounting evidence that subjects are not risk-neutral prot maximizers,
but rather risk-averse utility maximizers.
The discrete-choice model is a framework to relax the perfect rationality assumption and
to accommodate boundedly rational behavior (McFadden (2001)). Models in this framework
are motivated by empirical studies in which observed decisions exhibit some noise (see, e.g.,
Fischbacher and Stefani (2007), Loomes (2005), Rieskamp (2008) and Wilcox (2010)). Such
noise could come from observed sources like decision errors, but could also come from other
unobserved or unmodeled channels such as individual perceptions of the game, or sensitivity
to payo¤ changes. Due to the presence of such noise, people make decision errors and
hence do not behave consistently with their choices. Our Baseline treatment is essentially
a non-strategic choice-under-uncertainty problem for H-type players. Therefore, the classic
individual discrete-choice model is a natural setting to explore behavioral anomalies. The
bounded treatment introduces interactions of players. A general way to incorporate decision
error is the quantal response equilibrium rst proposed by McKelvey and Palfrey (1995),
which is based on the random utility-maximization model of McFadden (1973).
According to the discrete-choice framework, H-type players will choose to underreport if
and only if the di¤erence in the expected utilities is su¢ ciently large to exceed a stochastic
error denoted by "; i.e.,
EU(u)  h > ".
In the expression, u and h denote the expected prots from underreporting and reporting
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honestly, respectively. The parameter " is commonly assumed to be independently and
identically distributed across players and actions with a Type 1 extreme value (logit )
distribution. The error can arise come from many sources, including the inability to calculate
the expected payo¤ or trembling hands during decision making. A standard result of the
discrete-choice model framework is that under the above error distributional assumptions,
the underreporting probability bb is given by the relation below:
bb = PrfEU(u)  h > "g
=
1
1 + exp
h
 EU(u) h

i . (1)
The parameter  > 0 captures the sensitivity of subjects choices to the relative pay-
o¤s of the two choices. When  approaches innity, players choose underreporting and
honest-reporting with equal probability, independent of the relative expected payo¤s. When
 decreases, on the other hand, players put less probability weight on choices that yield
suboptimal payo¤s, and the probability that they make the optimal choice converges to 1
when  approaches 0. Put di¤erently,  is an index of the measurement error when subjects
calculate expected utility from underreporting.
Within this framework, this paper further relaxes the assumption of risk neutrality. In
particular, three behavioral models are estimated and compared: risk-aversion, and loss
aversion with- and without combining probability weighting. In the risk-aversion model,
subjects are assumed to have a CRRA-form utility function u() = 
1 r
1 r .
10 ;11 This model
o¤ers the possibility of explicitly testing the assumption of risk neutrality. If the estimated
r is signicantly di¤erent from zero, then the null hypothesis that subjects are risk neutral
can be rejected.
While the observed compliance behavior can be explained by risk attitude, it is also
consistent with the notion of loss aversion. Recent research has shown that that loss aversion
10Alternative utility forms such as CARA and power-expo utility do not change the t of the data.
11Data from the tax-compliance game alone do not have any identication power to jointly estimate
three parameters, since they only contain two moments (i.e., the fraction of subjects selecting the risky
lottery in the traditional rule and that in the bounded rule) given a xed payo¤ structure. To gain enough
identication power, we pool data from both the risk elicitation task and the tax-compliance game.
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provides a much better account of tax evasion both in the lab and in the eld (see, e.g.,El¤ers
and Hessing (1997), Yaniv (1999), King and She¤rin (2002), Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007)
and Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2010)). The loss-aversion model characterizes individuals as
loss averse in terms of reference income, denoted by R. For a given amount of money,
x > 0, and the value function v(x) (specied below), losses are weighted more than gains
(j   v( x)j > v(x)). This study follows Dhami and Al-Nowaihi (2007) and Dhami and Al-
Nowaihi (2010) by taking the honest post-tax income as the reference point: R = IH   TH .
The rationale for this reference point is as follows. If the reference point is selected di¤erently
say, the initial income or the income after cheating detection, then taxpayers are always in the
domain of losses or gains. In those cases, the asymmetry of gains and losses disappears, and
the analysis completely falls back to an expected-utility framework.12 The income relative
to the reference point is as follows:
i =
8<: IH   TH   F  R for i is caught.IH   TL  R for i is not caught.
The form of the utility function follows Tversky and Kahneman (1992). It is dened sepa-
rately over gains and losses: U(i) = i if i  0, and U(i) =  ( i) if i < 0. The 
and  are the parameters controlling for the curvature of the utility functions, and  is the
coe¢ cient of loss aversion. Subjects are considered loss-averse if  > 1.
Besides value functions, subjects could also have a nonlinear transformation of the prob-
ability scale (i.e. they overestimate low probabilities and underestimate high probabilities
(see, e.g. Kahneman and Tversky (1979))). In order to examine the e¤ect of subjective
probability weight, this paper estimates a third model combining the loss-averse utility form
with a probability-weighting function. In particular, this paper adopts a popular form of
the one-parameter probability-weighting function: w(p) = p

(p+(1 p)) , where   0. Note
that if  < 1, the weighting function has an inverted S shape, which is concave for low
probabilities and convex for high probabilities, and crosses the diagonal at the probability
of 1/3.
12More specically, such a framework is called Rank dependent expected utility theory (RDEU), which
can be considered as expected utility theory applied with a transformed cumulative probability distribution.
See Dhami and al-Nowaihi (2007) for more detail.
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Recall that H-type players are choosing between a safe lottery and a risky one with xed
probabilities in the traditional rule, but endogenous probabilities under the bounded rule.
In the following, denote parameter aas the perceived audit probability in the Bounded
treatment. The estimated parameter a answers the following question: If a bounded rule is
transformed into the context of a traditional rule, which exogenous audit probability abest
justies behavior? Moreover, how do risk attitude, probability weighting, or loss aversion
inuence subjectsperception of the audit probability? The conditional log-likelihood is the
following:
lnL(; ait) =
X
i;t
(
yit  ln
 
1
1 + exp[h E(u)

]
!
+(1  yit)  ln
 
exp[h E(u)

]
1 + exp[h E(u)

]
!)
(2)
E(l) =
8<: 0:6 22:5 + 0:4 2:5 for i 2 Traditional(1  a) 22:5 + a 2:5 for i 2 Bounded
where yi;t = 1(0) denotes that subject i underreports (reports honestly) in the tax-compliance
game in period t. Table 2 reports the estimation results of various behavioral models.
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Table 2: Comparison of behavioral models
Risk aversion Loss aversion
Loss aversion &
Probability Weighting
Traditional Bounded Traditional Bounded Traditional Bounded
Risk magnitude r
0.366
(0.350)
0.594
(0.055)
Gain domain curvature 
0.445
(0.034)
0.428
(0.038)
0.640
(0.459)
0.533
(0.075)
Loss domain curvature 
0.548
(0.052)
0.708
(0.030)
0.586
(0.068)
0.858
(0.073)
Loss-aversion coe¢ cient 
1.100
(0.802)
1.148
(0.030)
1.674
(0.123)
1.283
(0.171)
Weighting parameter 
1.150
(0.193)
0.899
(0.120)
Perceived audit prob. a
0.336
(0.017)
0.305
(0.007)
0.240
(0.023)
Noise 
0.667
(0.067)
0.618
(0.098)
0.266
(0.019)
0.256
(0.424)
0.430
(0.042)
0.289
(0.040)
Log-likelihood -1163.773 -1087.292 -1141.710 -1082.473 -1141.353 -1082.111
Observations 2331 2287 2331 2287 2331 2287
Notes: *10% signicance; **5% signicance, ***1% signicance. The standard errors are clustered on subjects.
Upon rst glance, all parameters in these models are signicant, suggesting that the alter-
native behavioral models help to explain the compliance behavior in our study. For instance,
the risk-aversion specication suggests that subjects are risk averse in both treatments, as
the CRRA coe¢ cient r is signicantly larger than zero. It indicates that risk aversion helps
to explain our data. The perceived audit probability for a risk-averse subject in the Bounded
treatment is about 0.34. The explanation is straightforward: To induce a similar compliance
pattern among subjects who are risk-averse, the audit capacity of the bounded rule can be
set smaller, such that it induces the same deterrence e¤ect compared to a traditional rule
with audit probability a = 0:336. In other words, fewer resources are needed to achieve the
same level of deterrence for risk-averse subjects for risk-neutral ones.
In the loss-aversion specication, subjects in both treatments exhibit loss aversion: The
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Figure 2: Observed and predicted underreporting rates
coe¢ cients of the loss-aversion parameter  are larger than 1 in both treatments, which
means that subjects are more sensitive to loss than to the equivalent magnitude of gain.
The slopes of the value function indicate concavity in the gain domain () and convexity in
the loss domain (). Moreover, a Vuong test on non-nested models favors the loss-aversion
model over the risk-aversion model (p < 0:05). If subjects are loss-averse, the bounded rule
is even cheaper to implement, as the induced deterrence rate only needs to be the same as
a traditional rule with audit probability a = 0:306.
The third specication combines loss-aversion utility and probability weighting. However,
the likelihood of this specication does not improve signicantly. Moreover, the probability-
weighting parameter  is not signicantly di¤erent from 1 for both treatments (p = 0:438
and 0:397 respectively). This means that the average subjective probability of the subjects is
pretty much in line with the objective audit probability. Overall, the results seem to indicate
that the driving force for the observed compliance frequency is more likely to be found in
the way they view losses and gains, rather than in how they assess probabilities.
Figure 2 displays the observed and predicted underreporting rates based on risk- and
loss-aversion models. Since estimation results suggest that probability weighting does not
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explain the data well, parameters are taken from the second specication of loss aversion
without probability weighting. Among the three models, the one using loss aversion ts our
data the best. Result 3 summarizes the section.
Result 3 The proportion of compliance behavior in both treatments is consistent with the
presence of loss aversion together with some stochastic decision errors, although not in prob-
ability weighting.
4 Coordination under the Bounded Rule
So far, the game introduced by the bounded rule is dominance solvable. In fact, it is not
di¢ cult to show that as long as the ex-ante probability of receiving high income (q) is lower
than 0.5, the H-type players always underreport, given the dominant strategy of L-type.
Essentially, the more L-type players in the population who honestly state their type with
certainty, the easier it is for the H-type players to pretend to be L-type.
This subsection examines the bounded rule in another parameter domain where the game
has multiple equilibria.13 In this new bounded-rule treatment called Bounded-Hq, every-
thing remains the same as the Bounded treatments, except that the ex-ante probability of
receiving high-income q becomes 0:9 instead of 0:5. This parameter q determines an im-
portant property of the bounded rule: A high q resembles a rich neighborhood where each
inhabitant is very likely to be wealthy. Hence, this new treatment explores the performance
of the bounded rule when the income distribution is left-skewed. In particular, it examines
whether the bounded rule loses its deterrence e¤ect in the presence of multiple equilibria.
To derive predictions for this treatment, rst assume that every taxpayer is a strategic,
expected-prot maximizer. According to non-cooperative game theory, the introduction
of the bounded rule with the same audit capacity changes the interaction of players into a
coordination game with incomplete information. There are two pure-strategy Nash equilibria
and one mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium in the game. In the pure-strategy equilibria, L-
type players play their dominant strategy of reporting truthfully. All H-type players opt
for underreporting (truth-reporting) if they believe other H-type players are going to cheat
13A formal illustration is in Appendix A.
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with probability higher(lower) than 0:432. There is also a symmetric mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium, in which H-type players underreport with probability 0:432.14
This prediction can be modied when introducing intrinsically honest players. Speci-
cally, let each taxpayer have a probability  of being an honest player. If  is su¢ ciently
large, strategic players will nd underreporting too risky to be worth the attempt. If that
is the case, this modication could be considered as a renement of the coordination game.
However, if  is small, the payo¤-dominant Nash equilibrium still exists, if a strategic player
has a strong belief in the noncompliance behavior of the other strategic players. The propor-
tion of honest players is about 15% in the other two treatments. Assuming strategic players
correctly anticipate that  = 0:15, the threshold beliefs inducing underreporting behavior
increases to 0:508. Nonetheless, the two pure-strategy equilibria remain the same.
Figure 3: Underreport rate over 30 periods
The overall underreport rate in the Bounded-Hq treatment is 33:95% over all 30 periods,
and 26:16% in the last 10 periods. According to Figure 3, it is clear that the deterrence
e¤ect is the strongest, as the non-compliance frequency is signicantly lower compared to
14For the proof, please refer to Appendix A. Note that there are other asymmetric equilibria in the game.
However, we ignore them in a symmetric setting, since these equilibria require unrealistic coordination among
symmetric players.
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the other two treatments (a two-sided Mann-Whitney ranksum test with p < 0:05). This
di¤erence is already salient in the rst period, and remains highly signicant throughout the
game. Note that the drastic change in behavior compared to the Bounded treatment cannot
be explained by subjectsrisk attitude: The estimated CRRA coe¢ cient r, based only on
risk elicitation data, does not indicate any signicant di¤erences between treatments.
Regarding auditing statistics, despite the fact that the total number of audits is smaller in
this treatment (even compared to the Bounded treatment (p < 0:05)), the audit frequency
turns out to be signicantly higher ( p < 0:05), due to the fact that fewer low-income
reports need to be audited. The audit success rate is remarkably higher as well (p < 0:05),
leading to the dishonest H-type players receiving a signicantly lower payo¤ than under the
Traditional treatment (p < 0:05). The average budget-usage ratio is 95.63%, which is again
signicantly higher than that under the traditional rule (32.03%).
Result 4 The non-compliance rate in the Bounded-Hq treatment is signicantly lower than
it is in both the Traditional and the Bounded treatments. This high deterrence rate is achieved
with signicantly lower implementation costs, and a higher budget-usage ratio.
The previous subsection shows that behavior in both treatments is consistent with a loss-
aversion model with stochastic decision errors. To examine how they explain the pattern
in this treatment, we perform the following exercise. We rst estimate the perceived audit
probability of the Bounded-Hq treatment given the ,  and  parameters obtained in
the Bounded treatment. Then we use all of the information to calculate the predicted
underreporting rate of the treatmentbbSE. It turns out thatbbSE is 33.80%, which is again very
close to the actual prediction 33.95%. This is an indication that behavior in the Bounded-Hq
treatment is again consistent with the loss-aversion model with decision errors.
Interestingly, the perceived probability in the Bounded-Hq treatment, 0.344, is only mildly
larger than that in the Bounded treatment, 0.305. That means a ve percentage increase
in audit probability perception leads to a 23 percent increase in compliance level. This
asymmetry stems from the fact that subjects value gains and losses di¤erently with respect to
the reference point. When the perceived audit probability is 0.305 in the Bounded treatment,
the value of underreporting is in the gain domain, and is marginally larger than 0, the value
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of the reference point. When this probability increases to 0.344, however, the value of
underreporting falls into the loss domain with a larger distance to the reference point. Since
subjects are loss-averse, they weight losses more than gains, which lowers underreporting
frequency more drastically.
Loss-averse players face a higher degree of strategic uncertainty and hence are more likely
to fail the coordination. If taxpayers are expected-prot maximizers, they will underreport
as long as they think the probability that others are going to underreport is larger than
0:432. It would be much harder, on the other hand, for loss-averse players to choose to
underreport. Given that they are more sensitive to losses than they are to gains, they will
choose to underreport only when they think the other H-types are going to underreport
with probability higher than 0:774. With 15% honest players, this probability even goes
up to 0:911. This threshold requires more coordination among taxpayers, and involves a
substantially higher degree of strategic uncertainty.
According to Brandenburger (1996)s denition, strategic uncertainty arises when there
is uncertainty concerning the purposeful behavior of players in an interactive decision sit-
uation, as opposed to a game against nature. Strategic uncertainty is widely documented
in many experimental studies such as coordination games (e.g. Huyck et al. (1990), Huyck
et al. (1991)), market entry games (e.g. Sundali et al. (1995); Erev and Rapoport (1998))
and bank runs (e.g. Garratt and Keister (2009); Schotter and Yorulmazer (2009)). Recently,
Heinemann et al. (2009) propose a method to measure strategic uncertainty by eliciting cer-
tainty equivalents analogous to measuring risk attitudes in lotteries. In their experiment, N
subjects have to choose simultaneously between a series of lottery pairs. In each pair, lottery
A always yields a sure xed payo¤, while lottery B yields a payo¤ if the minimum number
of players selected is k. They nd that the number of B-choices in coordination games de-
creases with an increasing coordination requirement k. Holding k constant, N has a strong
positive e¤ect on coordination, since a large N reduces the relative hurdle to coordination.
These behavioral patterns indicate that subjects are strategic uncertainty averse. Applying
the study by Heinemann et al. (2009) reveals that the risk-dominant equilibrium is more
likely to be chosen by the loss-averse subjects than by expected-prot maximizers.
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5 Learning and Social demographics
In the post-experiment questionnaire, subjects are asked to provide their social background
information such as gender and nationality. This information allows us to study how subjects
form and adjust their underreporting decisions under di¤erent rules. The rst specication
concerns compliance behavior. We use the following random-e¤ect probit model specication:
yit = xit + ui + "it .
The variable y equals 1 if subjects decide to underreport, and is equal to 0 otherwise.
Furthermore, x is a vector of explanatory variables, the ui represent individual random
e¤ects and  is a vector of parameters. The explanatory variables include subjectssocial
backgrounds such as gender, nationality and experience of economics. They also contain a
history of play such as underreporting performance in the previous period, period number
and its square term.
Apart from compliance behavior, this subsection also investigates how individual char-
acteristics and previous performance inuence players perceived audit probability of the
bounded rules. The loss-aversion model without probability weighting is estimated, allow-
ing the perceived a parameter to depend on the social background information vector :
a = x+ "it. The results of the two specications appear in Table 3.
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Table 3: The inuences of social background and learning on compliance behavior and audit
probability perception
Compliance behavior Audit Probability Perception
Traditional Bounded Bounded-Hq Bounded Bounded-Hq
Underreport Detection Experience
-0.102
(0.186)
-0.498
(0.195)
0.010
(0.105)
0.075
(0.038)
0.030

(0.006)
Period
-0.039
(0.026)
-0.040
(0.032)
-0.082
(0.023)
0.008
(0.007)
0.002

(0.006)
Period2
0.0006
(0.0008)
0.0004
(0.0009)
0.001
(0.0006)
-0.0001
(0.0002)
-0.0002
(0.0002)
Gender (1 for men)
0.756
(0.413)
0.960
(0.544)
0.459
(0.478)
-0.020
(0.017)
0.003
(0.011)
Years of learning economics
0.052
(0.186)
0.797
(0.287)
0.278
(0.214)
-0.015
(0.014)
-0.001
(0.005)
Econ experience  Game theory 0.083
(0.144)
-0.574
(0.274)
-0.066
(0.187)
0.012
(0.013)
-0.0009
(0.004)
Dummy for Eastern Europeans
0.015
(0.899)
-0.409
(0.922)
0.125
(0.925)
0.043
(0.022)
-0.020
(0.201)
Dummy for Dutch
-0.102
(0.691)
1.190
(0.777)
0.620
(0.677)
0.004
(0.019)
-0.025
(0.018)
Dummy for Chinese
-0.234
(0.652)
1.336
(0.798)
-0.009
(0.778)
-0.003
(0.019)
-0.014
(0.023)
Dummy for other Asian
-0.878
(0.784)
0.159
(0.971)
0.940
(0.968)
0.022
(0.025)
-0.026
(0.023)
Mach-IV Scale
0.025
(0.016)
-0.019
(0.018)
0.018
(0.015)
0.003
(0.003)
-0.0003
(0.004)
Tax Filing Experience
-0.005
(0.458)
-0.304
(0.492)
-0.339
(0.575)
0.011
(0.012)
0.001
(0.011)
Constant
-0.508
(2.091)
5.318
(2.308)
0.918
(1.800)
0.209
(0.042)
0.305
(0.038)
Log-likelihood -444.868 -359.410 -640.430 -997.726 -1437.232
Observations 957 912 1670 2287 3014
Notes: *10% signicance; **5% signicance, ***1% signicance. We only include observations which players receive high
income. Standard errors are clustered on individuals.
Various e¤ects are found in the regressions. The rst one concerns the e¤ect of learning. In
the Bounded treatment, detection experience in the previous round decreases non-compliance
propensity. Interestingly, players with a background in economics are more likely to underre-
port, which seems to suggest that training in economics results in behavior more in line with
homo-economicus. These e¤ects, however, do not exist in the other two treatments. In both
the Traditional and Bounded treatments, men are more likely to underreport than women
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are. However, this is not the case in the Bounded-Hq treatment. In fact, no other social
demographic information a¤ects behavior except for time. When perceived audit probabil-
ity depends on social demographic information under the bounded rule treatments, the only
variable that is signicant is the lag audited experience. That is, if a cheater was caught
in the previous period, the perceived audit probability increases. This pattern is largely
in line with reinforcement learning. The invariant inuences for social background infor-
mation might indicate that the e¤ect of bounded rules is robust. Subjects with a di¤erent
social background seem to react to the bounded rule in a similar manner, especially in the
Bounded-Hq treatment.
6 Conclusion
This paper examines the bounded rule as a new method in constructing an audit sample
more cost-e¤ectively. It audits all red-aggedreports whenever the total number of these
reports is no more than the maximum number of audits allowed by the budget, and merely
the maximum otherwise. Compared to a traditional rule which audits les with a constant
probability, the bounded rule can induce the same deterrence e¤ect with a lower budget.
The paper then tests the models predictions in a controlled laboratory experiment. Sub-
jects receive either high- or low income with a predetermined probability. On knowing a
certain auditing rule (traditional or bounded), they report income to the tax agency. In-
dividual prot maximization and non-cooperative game theory suggest that the two rules
have the same deterrence e¤ect. The experimental results indicate that the compliance rate
in the bounded rule is the same as that in the traditional rule. Given the same compliance
level induced, the bounded rule is more cost-e¤ective in terms of both the implementation
costs (i.e., the average number of audits conducted) and the budget-usage ratio (i.e., the
percentage of the budget used in actual audits). The deterrence e¤ect of a bounded rule is
even stronger in another parameter domain where it introduces multiple equilibria. It deters
subjects from coordinating on the payo¤-dominant equilibrium with a low implementation
cost. These results strongly favor the bounded rule to be a superior auditing rule.
In all treatments, the compliance rates are higher than the prediction, even taking into
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account the fraction of intrinsically honest players. About 60 percent of the subjects switch
their decisions alternatively. To explain behavioral anomalies, several choice models under
uncertainty are estimated and compared. Among these specications, loss aversion combined
with stochastic errors are more successful at tracking observed data patterns. History of play
also a¤ects their perception toward audit probability under the bounded rule. Incorporating
this evidence would better help tax administrations to adjust their policies to encourage
people to pay their taxes in a more cost-e¤ective way.
This study is just a rst step into the investigation of the bounded rule. In our cur-
rent setup, taxpayers only can decide whether to underreport or honestly report. In future
studies, the model could be extended to allow choices on the extent of underreporting. An-
other possible extension might involve introducing a human auditor to further examine the
strategic interactions. This would be useful, due to the fact that taxpayers can communicate
with each other in reality. Alm and McKee (2004) show that such cheap-talk communica-
tion could help taxpayers to coordinate on zero-compliance (payo¤-dominant) equilibrium.
However, if a strategic auditor could observe this, s/he would be able to adjust the audit
capacity accordingly to combat collusion among taxpayers.
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Appendix
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Proposition 1
Let K = [aN ], as K needs to be an integer. Thus, aBD = minf1; K=Lg = minf1; [aN ]=Lg.
Since L 6 N , aBD > a. That means, in the scenario where all players declare low income, the
audit probability aBD is equal to a. The H-type players are indi¤erent between the decisions
of underreporting and reporting honestly. If K > K , that means the lowest probability
of being audited is strictly larger than a. Hence, any K > K is su¢ cient to support full
compliance.
The simplest case to induce zero compliance is to set K = 0. Because of zero audit, self-
regarding, prot-maximizing H-type players always report low income, regardless of their
beliefs towards other H-types. More generally, if K < [a], the bounded rule cannot induce
any compliance for strategic players regardless of the income distribution. In other words,
in the worst-case scenario in which only one H-type player claims low income, the audit
probability he or she faces is lower than [a]. Hence, strategic H-type players will underreport.
A.2 Proof of Proposition 2
This subsection contains two parts. The rst part proves that given all players are rational,
strategic expected prot maximizers, the game introduced by the bounded rule is dominance
solvable. The second part shows that this claim still holds by introducing intrinsically honest
players.
The proof is trivial that reporting high income is a dominated strategy for the L-type
players. To prove that the best response of H-type players is underreporting given that L-
type players comply dominance, the expected payo¤ from underreporting should be strictly
larger than the sure payo¤ from reporting truthfully. Moreover, this holds regardless of the
beliefs that H-type players hold towards the other H-types.
First assume that a H-type player anticipates that no body other than him or her will
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underreport. That is, b0 = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1) = (0; 0:; ; ; 0). In this situation, low-income
reports are submitted by L-type. Since the probability of being a L-type is q = 0:5 for every
other player, the probability that exactly n out of N 1 players submit low-incomereports
follows the binomial distribution Bin (n;N   1; q) = Bin (n; 7; 0:5). The expected payo¤
from underreporting is therefore:
E(ljb0) =
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; q) fmin( 2
n+ 1
; 1) F + [1 min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)] Sg
= S   (S   F )
N 1P
n=0
Bin(n;N   1; Bi)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
= 22:5  20
7P
n=0
Bin(n; 7; 0:5)min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)
= 12:698
The sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully is 12:5. Hence, a self-interest, risk neutral H-type
player will underreport.
The remaining proof shows that for any given set of beliefs held by a H-type player, the
expected payo¤ from underreporting is always not less than E(ljb0). Assume that player
N thinks the rst N   1 players underreport with probability b = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1). The
probability that player i submit low-income is Bi = 1   q + qbi = 12(1 + bi). Note that
Bi 2 [12 ; 1]. To facilitate notation, dene an index vector I = (i1; i2; :::i7), with i1 6= i2 6= :::i7.
Each index takes a value from the set f1; 2; :::; 7g. The probability that n out of 7 other
players submit low-incomereports is:
Pr(njb) =
Cs7P
s=1
sQ
j=1
Bij
i7Q
k=s+1
(1 Bik)
The expected payo¤ from underreporting is therefore:
E(ljb) =
N 1P
n=0
Pr(njb) fmin( 2
n+ 1
; 1) F + [1 min( 2
n+ 1
; 1)] Sg
It turns out that for any given bi, @E(l)=@bi = (@E(l)=@Bi)  (@Bi=@bi) > 0.15 This
15Calculation is available upon request.
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means that the expected payo¤ from underreporting is increasing in the (subjective) propen-
sity to evade taxes. Hence, given any set of belief b = (b1; b2; :::; bN 1), E(ljb)  E(ljb0).
Hence, the best response of the H-type players is to underreport.
The second part of this subsection proves that the introduction of intrinsically honest
players does not change the directions of treatment di¤erence. Let  be the probability that
a player is intrinsically honest, and 1    be the probability that a player is a strategic,
self-regarding prot maximizer, where 0   < 1. We do not allow  = 1, since at least
one strategic player is thinking of this problem. In our setting, in particular, the number of
honest players N can be any number from 0 to 7 out of 8 players. We further assume that
the  is the same in both treatments.
To prove the statement, we only need to show that the inclusion of honest players does
not a¤ect the strategy of the prot maximizers. When the strategic players are assigned
to be L-types, they gain a higher payo¤ by reporting truthfully, regardless of the auditing
rule implemented. In the Traditional treatment, H-type prot maximizers only compare a
sure payo¤ of reporting truthfully and the expected payo¤ from the tax evasion gamble if
they underreport. Hence, the existence of honest players will not a¤ect their choices. In
the Bounded treatment, the subjective beliefs of strategic, H-type players of the number of
low-incomereports now become: Bi = (1  q) + q(1  )b. Given that q = 0:5, 0   < 1,
B still lies in the interval [1
2
; 1]. Therefore, Proposition 2 still holds.
In the presence of honest players, the non-compliance rate of both treatments becomes:
P
Bin(n;N; q)(1  ) = (1  ) .
A.3 The Existence of Coordination
If this game is a coordination game, there exists an b 2 [0; 1] such that the payo¤ from
underreporting is equal to the honest payo¤:
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E(u;N; q;K; bi) =
N 1X
n=0
Bin(n;N   1;Bi) [(1  aBD) (IH   TL) + aBD  (IH   TH   F )]
= IH   TH .
Due to the discrete nature of the distribution, a direct proof is di¢ cult. However, just
for illustration purposes, if N is large, the expected number of low-income reports is
BiN = [(1  q) + qbi]N . The expected prot from underreporting could be simplied as
E(u) =
K
BiN
(IH   TH   F ) + (1  K
BiN
)(IH   TL)
= IH   TH .
Solving the equation yields Bi = K(TH + F   TL)=N(TH   TL). Hence, there exists a
set of parameters K,TH ,F ,TL, N and q such that Bi 2 (0; 1). Thus, in certain parameter
domains, the H-type players under the bounded rule nd themselves indi¤erent between
underreporting and honestly-reporting if bi = b =
Bi (1 q)
q
. If bi > b, then the H-types all
underreport; if bi < b, then the H-types all report honestly.
A.4 Equilibrium Analysis for Bounded-Hq Treatment
Let i(j) be the probability that type i player (H-type or L-type) will use strategy j (u or h).
There are two pure Nash equilibria and one mixed-strategy equilibrium in this treatment:
f(H(u) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(h) = 1; L(h) = 1); (H(u) = 0:432; L(h) = 1)g.
In words, the two pure Nash equilibria are 1) all H-type players underreport and 2) all H-type
players honestly report. L-type players always honestly report.
Let us examine the former case. Given that a H-type player thinks that all other H-
types choose strategy u, s/he will have an expected payo¤ of 17.5 by playing strategy l.
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By deviating to h, the payo¤ decreases to 12.5. Since we assume symmetry among players,
no one has the incentive to deviate from underreporting, which constitutes a NE. A highly
similar analysis applies to the latter case. Given that all other H-type players play strategy
h, a strategy deviation from h to l will yield a lower expected payo¤ for H-type players (from
12.5 to 3.59). Hence, no one has an incentive to deviate.
On top of the two pure equilibria, the game has also a mixed-strategy equilibrium in which
each H-type player is indi¤erent between the strategy of honest-reporting and underreporting.
Given the game parameters, the underreporting probability b that induces utility indi¤erence
is bSE = 0:432.
Note that the game has other asymmetric equilibria. However, we ignore them in a
symmetric setting, since these equilibria require unrealistic coordination among symmetric
players.
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B Instructions
B.1 Instructions Comparison
The instructions given in the next subsection are for the Bounded treatment. These instruc-
tions di¤er from those given for the other treatments as follows:
 Traditional treatment
1. The second bullet (concerning matching protocol) of the list under Task Descrip-
tionin the instructions for the Tax Compliance Gameis absent.
2. The Audit Probability Tableis absent.
3. The phrase see audit prob. tablein the Payo¤ Tablebecomes 0.4.
 Bounded-Hq treatment
1. In the third bullet of the list under Task Description in the instructions for
the Tax Compliance Game, the probability of receiving e25 becomes 0.9, and
accordingly the probability of receiving 10 becomes 0.1.
2. In the Payo¤Table(immediately before Payment Methodin the instructions
for the Tax Compliance Game), the probabilities in the second column become
0.9 and 0.1, respectively.
B.2 Instructions for Bounded Treatment
 Please read these instructions carefully!
 Please do not talk to your neighbours and remain quiet during the entire experiment.
 If you have a question, please raise your hand. We will come to you to answer it.
 You will receive a show-up fee of e3 for completing all tasks in the experiment, inde-
pendent of your performance.
Task Description
40
 This session consists of 30 periods of play; each period is completely independent of
the others.
 Of the participants in the room, two groups of 8 participants will be randomly formed
at the beginning of each period. You will not know the identity of the other players in
your group in any period.
 At the beginning of each period, you will receive a taxable income of either e25 or
e10. The probability of receiving e25 is 0.5; the probability of receiving e10 is 0.5.
 Your task is to report your income to the auditor, which is played by a computer. The
amount that you report is your decision. You can report either e25 or e10, regardless
of your received income.
After-tax Income Determination
Your after-tax income in this period is determined by the following two steps: tax payment
and an audit.
Step One: Tax payment
The tax rate is 50% for those who reported e25 and 25% for those who reported e10.
Suppose the income you received is e25:
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax.
So your after-tax income in this period equals to e25 e12.5 = e12.5.
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So
your after-tax income in this period equals to e25 e2.5 = e22.5.
Suppose the income you received is e10:
 If you report e10 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e2.5 (25% of e10) as tax. So
your after-tax income in this period equals to e10 e2.5 = e7.5.
 If you report e25 to the auditor, the auditor will charge e12.5 (50% of e25) as tax.
So your after-tax income in this period equals to e10 e12.5 = -e2.5.
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 In sum, the auditor charges tax based on your reported income, instead of your received
income.
Step Two: Audit
The auditor does not know your received income unless your report is audited later .
Auditing procedure:
 If your reported income is e25, it will not be audited. That means what you have
earned in step one (e12.5 or -e2.5) will be your after-tax income (if your received
income is e25 and e10, respectively).
 Regardless of your received income, if your reported income is e10, there is a chance
that your report will be audited. The outcome is as follows:
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is also e10.
Then what you have earned in step one (e7.5) will be your after-tax income, no
matter whether your report is audited or not.
 Suppose your reported income is e10 AND your received income is e25. If your
report is not audited, you will keep the e22.5 earned in step one; if audited, you
will get e2.5.
Auditing probability:
The number of reports the auditor will audit depends on the number of players reporting
an income of e10 in a group.
- If the number of e10 income reports is equal to two or less, the auditor will audit all of
the e10 reports.
- If the number of e10 income reports is three or more, then two out of such reports will
be randomly selected for audit.
 The Audit Probability Tablebelow shows the audit probabilities for a player who
reported an income of e10.
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Audit Probability Table
Number of e10 reports 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Audit Probability 100% 100% 100% 66:7% 50% 40% 33:3% 28:6% 25%
 The Payo¤ Tablebelow summarizes all of the possible scenarios you may encounter
in one period and the related payo¤s:
Payo¤ Table
Received Probability Reported Audit After-tax Income After-tax Income
Income Income Probability if audited if NOT audited
e25 0:5 e25 0 e12:5 e12:5
e10 see audit prob. table e2:5 e22:5
e10 0:5 e10 see audit prob. table e7:5 e7:5
e25 0  e2:5  e2:5
Payment Method
 At the end of this experiment, one out of 30 periods will be selected to determine your
payo¤ for this task. The computer program will generate a random number from 1
to 30. This number will determine one of the 30 periods. Your performance in that
period determines your payo¤.
 You will be paid based on your after-tax income for the randomly selected period.
 Because each period is equally likely to be selected for payment determination, you
should make your decision in each period as if that period would be selected for pay-
ment.
 Your payo¤ will be paid out in cash at the end of the experiment along with your
earnings in the other task(s).
We will now show you what the computer screens look like.
SCREEN 1
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Period     1 out of 30                                                Remaining time [sec]:  36
Your taxable income is: € 25
        What is the amount of income you report to the auditor?
Your Decision: €10 口
€ 25 口
Report___
In Screen 1, you can decide the amount of income to report to the auditor. Please select
either e10or e25, and conrm your choice by pressing the Reportbutton.
Warning: Before pressing the button, make sure your choice is correct. You cannot change
your decision after you have pressed OK.
SCREEN 2
Period       1 out of 30 Remaining time [sec]: 40
                      The results of this period are as follows:
    Income you received: € 25
Income you reported: € 10
    Your after-tax income in this period: €22.5
OK___
Screen 2 is the feedback table you will receive regarding your after-tax income. Your
will nd information on the initial taxable income you received, the income you reported
and your after-tax income in this period.
Click on OK when you nish checking the information.
Note that the purpose of the screen shots is to clarify the procedure, rather than provide
advice about how to act. You should make the decisions that are best for you.
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B.2.1 Risk Elicitation Task16
Task Description
In this task, you are asked to make decisions related to 21 choice pairs. In each choice
pair, you need to select between two lotteries labeled Lottery Aand Lottery B. Please,
take your time and read each choice pair carefully. An example of a typical choice pair is
given below:
Choice Lottery A e5.5 with probability 0.5 or e3.5 with probability 0.5 Your Lottery A 
No.1 Lottery B e9 with probability 0.5 or e0.5 with probability 0.5 choice: Lottery B 
Payment Method
 You need to make choices for all 21 choice pairs. However, only one of the 21 choices
you have made will be chosen for the payo¤ determination of this task. First, the
computer program will generate a random number from 1 to 21. This number will
determine a choice pair. Then, the computer program will simulate the lottery you
have chosen and reveal the outcome on your screen. The outcome of this lottery will
determine your payo¤.
 For example, suppose that the computer program has generated a random number 2.
It will then check what you have selected in choice pair number 2. Suppose that you
have chosen Lottery A in that choice pair. Then the computer program will simulate
Lottery A and reveal your payo¤ (either e5.5 or e3.5). Your payo¤ will be paid out
in cash at the end of the experiment along with your earnings for the other task.
It is important that you fully understand the lottery selection task. Please raise your
hand if you have any questions at this moment.
16The risk elicitation task is conducted after the tax-compliance game. However, the subjects do not
know the existence of this task when they were playing the tax-compliance game.
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B.2.2 Post-experimental Questions
Questions on Treatment Manipulation
Please evaluate the following statements with respect to the tax reporting task:17
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion, 5=slightly
agree, 6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly agree
1. The instructions were clearly formulated.
2. I felt that I performed well on the task.
3. I received plenty of time to carry out the task.
4. I was motivated to do well on the task.
5. The task was fun to perform, motivating me to achieve a payo¤ as high as possible.
6. I considered the tax reporting task as fairly complex.
7. My payo¤ is determined not only by my own decision, but also by the decisions of the
other players.
8. When making my decision, I thought about what other players might do.
9. I feel obliged to report the received income in each period.
10. The chance I have received e25 is about 50%.18
Questions on Background Information
Please answer the following survey questions. Your answers will be used for this study
only. Individual data will not be exposed.
1. What is your gender?
17The rst ve questions are used to understand the subjectsperception about the experimental setup
and instructions in general. We do not expect to nd di¤erences across treatments. The last ve questions
focus on capturing di¤erent types of manipulations of the treatments; therefore, we expect to see di¤erences
across manipulations.
18In the Bounded-Hq treatment, the chance should be 90%, instead of 50%.
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2. What is your nationality?
3. How many years have you already studied in economics?
4. Have you ever had a course related to game theory?
5. Have you ever had a part-time job?
Questions on Mach IV Scale19
In the following you will nd a list of statements. Please read them carefully and answer
them to what extent you agree or disagree. Even if in some cases you would like to say that
your answers depend on the circumstances, you should only choose one of the answers. Since
all responses are anonymous you can answer freely. There is nobody on whom you need to
make a good impression. Only if you answer very honestly can the results be used.
1=strongly disagree, 2=somewhat disagree, 3=slightly disagree, 4=no opinion,
5=slightly agree, 6=somewhat agree, 7=strongly disagree
1. Never tell anyone the real reason you did something unless it is useful to do so.
2. The best way to handle people is to tell them what they want to hear.
3. One should take action only when sure it is morally right.
4. Most people are basically good and kind.
5. It is safest to assume that all people have a vicious streak and it will come out when
they are given a chance.
6. Honesty is the best policy in all cases.
7. There is no excuse for lying to someone else.
8. Generally speaking, people wont work hard unless theyre forced to do so.
9. All in all, it is better to be humble and honest than to be important and dishonest.
19Questions 3, 4, 6, 7, 9, 10, 11, 14, 16 and 17 are reverse coded.
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10. When you ask someone to do something for you, it is best to give the real reasons for
wanting it rather than giving reasons which carry more weight.
11. Most people who get ahead in the world lead clean, moral lives.
12. Anyone who completely trusts anyone else is asking for trouble.
13. The biggest di¤erence between most criminals and other people is that the criminals
are stupid enough to get caught.
14. Most people are brave.
15. It is wise to atter important people.
16. It is possible to be good in all respects.
17. Barnum was wrong when he said that theres a sucker born every minute.
18. It is hard to get ahead without cutting corners here and there.
19. People su¤ering from incurable diseases should have the choice of being put painlessly
to death.
20. Most people forget more easily the death of their parents than the loss of their property.
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